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CIVIL RIGHTS
Title VII Discrimination Actions:
Applicable or Inapplicable to the Partnership Decision?
Hishon v. King & Spalding
678 F.2d 1022 (11th Cir. 1982).
I. BACKGROUND AND FACTUAL INFORMATION
A N UNDERLYING PREMISE of a partnership is that it is a strictly voluntary
association between two or more persons for a business purpose.I The
concept that a partnership can be forced against its will to accept another in-
dividual into the organization as a partner is repugnant to the underlying premise
of voluntariness of association.2 One purpose of Title VII of The Civil Rights
Act of 19641 is to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex and to place men
and women on an equal footing.4 In order for this equal footing to exist, an
individual's capabilities can be the only criteria used to determine whether or
not an employee is entitled to a position. 5 In the past, the outer limits of Title
VII have been liberally construed in the broadest possible terms so as to en-
compass the entire working environment, including the professional fields of
law and medicine.6
Herein lies the perplexing problem with which the court in Hishon v. King
& Spalding7 was confronted. The partner's interest in voluntary association
had to be weighed and balanced against the government's interest in the elimina-
tion of employment discrimination on the basis of sex. The court had to decide
whether or not Title VII was applicable to the decision made by a professional
partnership not to elevate an associate to partner status.'
'A partnership is defined as "a voluntary contract between two or more competent persons to place their
money, effects, labor, and skill, or some or all of them, in lawful commerce or business, with the
understanding that there shall be a proportional sharing of the profits and losses between them" (emphasis
added). BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1009 (rev. 5th ed. 1979); See also, Burr v. Greeland, 356 S.W.2d 370,
376 (Tex. Cir. Appl. 1962).
'Hishon v. King & Spalding, 678 F.2d 1022 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 813 (1983).
3Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
'Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 1971).
5Id.
'EEOC v. Rinella & Rinella, 401 F. Supp. 175 (N.D. Ill. 1975); See also, Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine &
Moore, 425 F. Supp. 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
'678 F.2d 1022 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 813 (1983).
'Id. at 1024.
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King & Spalding is a professional partnership located in Atlanta, Georgia,
established for the purpose of practicing law.9 The partnership is a relatively
large law firm consisting of approximately fifty partners and fifty associates.
In 1972, Elizabeth Anderson Hishon was hired as an associate with the firm.
The firm had an "up or out" policy in which all associates were considered
for partnership after approximately six years of service with the firm. Under
this policy, an associate would either receive an invitation to join the firm as
a partner or would be asked to secure employment elsewhere.
In May of 1978, six years after Ms. Hishon was hired, a partnership meeting
was held to consider the elevation of various associates to the position of part-
ner. Although other male associates were invited to join the partnership, Ms.
Hishon and two other male associates were notified that they should seek
employment elsewhere. Upon Ms. Hishon's request, the partnership reconsidered
her status with the firm in the partnership meeting of May 1979, but again
decided not to extend her an invitation to join the partnership. As a result,
she left the firm on December 31, 1979.
Ms. Hishon filed a sex discrimination claim with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission which issued a Notice of a Right to Sue, whereupon
Ms. Hishon filed a three count complaint in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia.'I In the first count, Ms. Hishon alleged
that the partnership decision had discriminated against her on the basis of her
sex in violation of Title VII.II In the second count, she alleged a violation of
the Equal Pay Act. I2 The third count was founded upon a breach of contract
theory. 1 3 The district court only considered the alleged sex discrimination charge
and granted King & Spalding's motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1)."' The plaintiff then appealed the decision to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and in so doing agreed to
limit the appeal to the threshold jurisdictional issue of whether Title VII is appli-
cable to the partnership decision.'I The second and third counts of the original
'A synopsis of the facts are presented. A complete presentation of the facts including useful background
information regarding correspondence among opposing counsel and the court can be found in the Eleventh
Circuit's opinion. Id.
,OId.
'42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976). The actual text of this statute is as follows:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer -
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex or national origin. Id.
229 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1976).
"1678 F.2d at 1025.
'Id. The district court, in holding Title VII inapplicable to partnership decisions, dismissed the case under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
"Id. at 1025 n.4.
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complaint were informally withdrawn by the plaintiff in her brief and subse-
quently dismissed without prejudice.' 6 Thus, the only issue which the court
of appeals had to consider was whether or not Title VII was applicable to the
partnership decision. '7
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Title VII was not applic-
able to a decision made by the partnership not to promote an associate to partner
status."8 This casenote attempts a critical analysis of the relevant law and the
rationale used by the court in reaching this decision. It will further point out
some potentially serious implications which could arise in the future since the
Supreme Court of the United States has agreed to decide this issue later this
year. 19
A court should refuse to grant a motion to dismiss a complaint under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and should decide the issue on the
merits of the case unless there is no doubt that the plaintiff would be unable
to prove any facts which would entitle her to relief.20 Since Title VII is remedial
in nature, it must be liberally construed in its broadest sense in order to effec-
tuate its purpose.2' When analyzing the Hishon court's rationale, both of these
concepts must be kept in mind. The Hishon court, however, found that even
under such a broad and liberal reading, Title VII was not applicable to part-
nership decisions and matters of voluntary association.22
Ms. Hishon proposed three theories under which jurisdiction could be based
upon Title VII. 23 Under the first theory, the plaintiff urged the court to find
that the partners at King & Spalding were analogous to employees of a cor-
poration. Under the second theory, she contended that the partnership invita-
tion was a term, condition or privilege of employment and an opportunity for
employment, all protected by Title VII. Third, Ms. Hishon urged the court
to find that her termination of employment was an unlawful discharge in viola-
tion of Title VII.
II. KING & SPALDING - PARTNERSHIP OR CORPORATION
Under Ms. Hishon's first theory of jurisdiction, she urged the court to
find that the partnership was in reality a corporation in which the partners
"BId. at 1025 n.5.
17Id.
'oid.
"The history of Hishon is as follows: Hishon v. King & Spalding, 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1303
(N.D. Ga. 1980), aff'd, 678 F.2d 1022 (1lth Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 813 (1983).
20678 F.2d at 1026. See also, McClain v. Real Estate Board of New Orleans, Inc. 444 U.S. 232 (1980);
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
"Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971).
See also, Note, Relative Qualifications and the Prima Facie Case in Title VII Litigation, 82 COLUM. L.
REV. 553 (1982).
22678 F.2d at 1026.
23Id.
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were mere employees. The elevation from associate to partner could then be
considered a promotion. Sex discrimination in promoting is prohibited by Title
VII. 24
Ms. Hishon first attempted to convince the court that a partnership had
"an established institutional identity independent of it's individual partners" 25
and that this independent institutional identity was in reality a corporation. 26
She argued that King & Spalding, by having formally composed a detailed
partnership agreement in writing, had in effect incorporated the partnership
into a corporation." The court found little merit in either of these contentions
since under Georgia law a partnership was a legally recognized institution and
could be created either by parol or written contract. 2
The appellant then unsuccessfully attempted to convince the court that
the term "employee" was synonymous to the term "partner" for Title VII
purposes.29 In support of her contention, she cited as authority a United States
Supreme Court case in which the Court held that various members of a
cooperative who were subject to termination for producing inferior products
or disobeying regulations were deemed to be "employees" with the meaning
of the Fair Labor Standards Act.3" Whether or not an individual is an employee
for Title VII purposes is a question of federal law which is to be determined
by a four part test which takes into consideration (1) the language of the statute
itself; (2) the legislative history; (3) federal case law; and (4) the circumstances
surrounding the case.3'
As to the statutory language of Title VII, the court in Hishon did not find
the language to be very helpful. The court cited the Act as defining the word
"employee" simply as "an individual employed by an employer." '3 2 However,
'Id., See also Kober v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 480 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1973).
"Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 95 (1974).
216678 F.2d at 1026.
27Id
"GA. CODE ANN. § 75-101 (Supp. 1982). The text of the statute is as follows: "A partnership may be created
either by written or parol contract, or it may arise from a joint ownership, use, and emjoyment of the
profits of undivided property, real or personal."
29678 F.2d at 1026.
"Goldberg v. Whitaker House Cooperative, Inc., 366 U.S. 28 (1961).
"Calderon v. Martin County, 639 F.2d 271, 273 (5th Cir. 1981).
"The relevant sections and definitions of Title VII are as follows:
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (1976). "The term 'person' includes one or more individuals, governments,
governmental agencies, political subdivisions, labor unions, partnerships, associations, corporations, legal
representatives, mutual companies, joint-stock companies, trusts, unincorporated organizations, trustees,
trustees in bankruptcy, or receivers." (emphasis added).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1976). "The term 'employer' means a person engaged in an industry affecting
commerce who has fifteen or more employees . . . and any agent of such a person ...."
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1976). "The term 'employee' means an individual employed by an
employer .... "
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(g) (1976). "The term 'commerce' means trade, traffic, commerce, transportation,
transmission or communication among the several States . .. ."
[Vol. 17:1
4
Akron Law eview, Vol. 17 [1984], Iss. 1, Art. 8
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol17/iss1/8
if the plain language of the statute is examined, a different conclusion might
be reached by utilizing the following analysis: The term person includes both
individuals and partnerships. Since an employee is an individual employed by
an employer and an individual is also a person, a partnership can be considered
to be an employee of the employer. Likewise, since an employer is a person,
an employer may also be classified as a partnership. Thus, broadly construing
the statutes, the individual partners at King & Spalding could be considered
to be employees employed by the partnership.
However, the Hishon court refused to seize upon the language used in
Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore33 which stated that the "language indicates
a Congressional intent to define discrimination in the broadest possible terms
and to include the entire scope of the working environment within the Act's
protective ambit." 3 ' In Lucido, the plaintiff was an attorney employed by the
defendant firm as an associate for over seven years. Lucido, like Hishon was
promised an elevation to partner status upon satisfactory performance of his
duties as an associate." The firm also had an "up or out" policy under which
the associate would have to seek employment elsewhere if not offered a partner-
ship. Lucido was not offered a partnership and was asked to leave the firm.
He filed a suit based on a Title VII discrimination action, contending that he
was discriminated against because of his national origin (Italian) and his religion
(Catholic). The court in Lucido unlike the Hishon court refused to dismiss the
complaint and held that a cause of action was stated under the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.36
Having found the statutory language of Title VII to be of no assistance,
the Hishon court next studied the legislative history of Title VII but found
it to be very sparse, consisting of only one remark by Senator Clark made during
a Senate Debate. The Senator had stated that the term "employer" should have
its common dictionary meaning.' In reality, the court refused to recognize other
pieces of legislative history which indicated that it was the intent of Congress
to eliminate job discrimination even in high level professional jobs."8
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(h) (1976). "The term 'industry affecting commerce' means an activity, business,
or industry in commerce .
"1425 F. Supp. at 126.
'4Id. See also Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971).
"425 F. Supp. at 128. The fact pattern in Lucido is almost a mirror image of the fact pattern in Hishon
but the Hishon court refused to accept the Lucido court's rationale.
36Id.
"110 CONG. REC. 7216 (1964). Webster defined "employer" as "one who employs, especially a person,
business firm, etc. that hires one or more persons to work for wages or salary." WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD
DICTIONARY 459 (1980).
"EEOC v. Rinella & Rinella, 401 F. Supp. 175, 179 (N.D. I11. 1975); During Senate debates for a proposed
amendment which would have made Title VII inapplicable to physicians employed by a hospital, Senator
Williams spoke against the amendment as follows:
As I stand here leading the debate on this measure, I try hard to think as a young person who
has gone through that long, hard and expensive trail to be the graduate of a medical school, be
he man or woman, black or white, or whatever national ancestry. I say that in this Nation, which
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One of the strongest points of the Hishon court's argument and perhaps
the most persuasive was presented in its discussion of existing federal case law.
In Burke v. Friedman, 39 the plaintiff, an employee of the defendant accounting
firm, filed a sex discrimination charge for unlawful dismissal under Title VII.
The firm was organized as a partnership consisting of four partners and thir-
teen other employees. The court in Burke addressed the precise issue of whether
a partner could be construed as an employee in order to invoke the protection
of Title VII. If the partners could be considered employees then the total number
of employees would be seventeen, two greater than the fifteen necessary to
qualify the defendant firm as a person within the meaning of the Act. 0 The
Burke court held that the partners could not be classified as employees and
therefore the protection of Title VII could not be invoked. 1
In determining whether or not an individual is an employee for Title VII
purposes, the particular circumstances surrounding a case must be examined
using "the economic realities test''42 as set forth in Spirides v. Reinhardt.3
In Spirides, the court had to make a determination of whether an individual
was, as her written contract stated, an independent contractor instead of an
employee. The court in Spirides held that the court should review "all the cir-
cumstances surrounding Spirides' work relationship""" and that the economic
realities of the working relationship must be analyzed in light of the particular
facts of each case. 5 In Donovan v. Techco," Secretary of Labor Donovan
filed a suit seeking an injunction to enjoin violations of the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act. The court once again applied the economic realities test and reasoned
that "the label attached to the relationship is dispositive only to the degree
that it mirrors the economic reality of the relationship."" 7 Hence, the court
so badly needs doctors, it would be a terrible crime if because of ethnic background, sex, race or
religion, the American people were denied the services of the new doctor.
This is exactly what this amendment would do. It would take from a doctor the protection
that the Constitution gives him and would protect through this law. I think that it would be against
all that this country holds itself up to be, in an area of one of our greatest needs. Id. quoted in
118 CONG. REC. 1647 (1972).
Senator Javits also expressed his opposition to the amendment:
Yet this amendment would go back beyond decades of struggle and of injustice and reinstate
the possibility of discrimination on grounds of ethnic origin, color, sex, religion - just confined
to physicians or surgeons, one of the highest rungs of the ladder that any member of a minority
could attain - and thus lock in and fortify the idea that being a doctor or suregon is just too good
for members of a minority, and that they have to be subject to discrimination in respect of it, and
the Federal law will not protect them. Id. quoted in 118 CONG. REc. 1463 (1972).
Accord, Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARV. L. REV. 945 (1982); Note,
Title VII And Employment Discrimination in "Upper Level" Jobs, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1514 (1973).
39556 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1977).
4'42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1976).
4'556 F.2d at 870.
42613 F.2d 826 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
43Id.
"Id. at 833.
"Id. at 831.
46642 F.2d 141 (5th Cir. 1981).
"Id. at 143.
[Vol. 17:1
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considered the theory that an individual's status "must turn on the facts of
each case" 8 and attempted to balance this with the concept that the definition
of employee as used in Title VII was not restrictive. 9 The conclusion which
the court in Hishon reached was that the partners were not employees under
Title VII, but partners in a voluntary association formed to practice law."0 The
individual characteristics which the court considered included the detailed part-
nership agreement, the operation of the firm under Georgia law as a partnership
and the fact that the firm filed income tax returns as a partnership.I The court,
having refused to broadly interpret the definitions of the Act, turned to Ms.
Hishon's second basis for jurisdiction.
III. ELEVATION TO PARTNERSHIP: PRIVILEGE OF
EMPLOYMENT OR EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
Under her second theory for jurisdictional basis, Ms. Hishon contended
that King & Spalding had promised her that she would be offered a partner-
ship in return for performing satisfactorily as an associate.52 She contended
that this promise was a term, condition or privilege of employment and that
denial of a promotion to a partner was in effect a denial of an employment
opportunity, 3 all of which were protected by Title VII.54 As authority, she
cited four major cases, three of which can be easily distinguished from her
case and consequently disposed of.5' The fourth case was exactly on point' 6
but the Eleventh Circuit absolutely rejected both its holding and rationale.
In Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB,57 Golden State had discharged
a truck driver who had been very active in union activities. The court found
Golden State liable and ordered them to reinstate the driver with back pay,
based on the amount that he would have received if he had been promoted
from a driver to a distributor in accordance with company policy. In NLRB
v. Bell Aircraft Corp.,I8 the court held that Melvin Finch, an employee and
member of the union, had been discriminated against when he was refused
a promotion to the position of assistant foreman. Finch had returned to work
during a strike, whereupon the union filed charges against him pursuant to
a strike settlement between Bell and the union which prohibited Bell from pro-
'McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896 (1972).
"gId. at 557.
5678 F.2d at 1028.
5,Id.
521d.
53Id.
"42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976).
"Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168 (1973); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co.,
494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974); NLRB v. Bell Aircraft Corp., 206 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1953).
"Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 425 F. Supp. 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
"414 U.S. 168 (1973).
"-206 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1953).
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moting Finch to a supervisory position. 9 The court held that "[a]t the time
the discrimination took place, he was clearly a protected employee, and his
prospects for promotion were among the conditions of his employment." 60
The Hishon court correctly concluded that "an 'opportunity' can include a
promotion to a position beyond that of an 'employee' covered by Title VII.'61
But it once again refused to broadly construe and extend the term "employ-
ment opportunities" to include elevation to a partner on the grounds that it
would encroach upon the basic premise that a partnership was a voluntary
organization. 62 The court concluded that the scales of justice should tip in favor
of the partners and that the interests of the employee were subservient to those
of the partners. These interests can best be defined by the language used in
John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston.63 After Wiley had merged with another
corporate owner, the Supreme Court held that the new corporate employer
had to arbitrate according to the collective bargaining agreement which was
in effect when the entire company was owned by Wiley. The Court noted that
"[t]he objectives of national labor policy, reflected in established principles
of federal law, require that the rightful prerogative of owners independently
to re-arrange their businesses and even eliminate themselves as employers be
balanced by some protection to the employees from a sudden change in the
employment relationship. '64
The third case which the court had to distinguish from Ms. Hishon's situa-
tion was Pettway v. American Case Iron Pipe.'5 The defendant company was
organized under the Eagan Plan. Under this plan the Board of Directors was
responsible for the business policy of the company and was elected by the
stockholders. The Board of Management conducted the general day-to-day
business of the company and was elected by the Board of Directors. The Board
of Operatives was elected by the employees themselves and served the func-
tion of providing a mode of communication between the employees and the
Board of Management. When Eagan, the founder of the company, died he
bequeathed all outstanding stock of the company to the members of the Board
of Management and the Board of Operatives jointly and to their successors,
to be held in trust for the present and future employees of the company. Since
membership on the Board of Operatives was restricted to white males, the court
found this policy to be a violation of Title VII and held that membership on
the Board was a valuable term, condition or privilege of employment. 66 Keep-
ing in mind that the Board of Directors was elected by the stockholders, it is
"Id.
111d. at 237.
1678 F.2d at 1028.
62Id.
"1376 U.S. 543 (1964).
64Id. at 549.
65494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974).
"Id.
[Vol. 17:1
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crucial to note that two members of the Board of Operatives had been elected
directly to the Board of Directors.6 ' Since the Board of Operatives held the
stock in trust, the members could conceivably have the opportunity to control
their own destiny by using their influence to get themselves elected to the Board
of Directors. Although Ms. Hishon had made what appeared to be a very strong
argument in favor of her position, the court held Pettway to be inapplicable
because as it interpreted the case, "[t]he employees remained employees even
while serving on the Board and never actually 'owned' the company in their
individual capacities but acted 'in trust' for all present and future employees." 68
Probably the strongest arguments in favor of Ms. Hishon's position can
be expressed and found in the language of Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine, &
Moore. 9 Lucido's fact situation and allegations were very similar to Ms.
Hishon's situation. The court in Lucido first examined the definitions of
employer and employee as defined in Title VII and construed the terms in the
broadest possible sense, in accordance with congressional intent.70 Lucido was
found to be an employee and the defendant partnership an employer within
the meaning of the Act. The court in Lucido correctly held that a cause of
action brought under Title VII should not be dismissed under Rule 12(b) of
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,7" unless the plaintiff would not be en-
titled to recover even if everything he alleged were true."' Applying the above
criteria, the Lucido court held that "the oppportunity to become a partner at
Cravath was a 'term, condition or privilege of employment' and an 'employ-
ment opportunity' within the meaning of the Act." '73 However, the Hishon
court did not expound on Lucido in any detail whatsoever and attempted to
cast away Lucido's holding by classifying it as mere dicta."' In reality, however,
what had occurred was simply a dispute between the circuits. As the Hishon
court stated, "[i]n any event, we respectfully disagree with that court's state-
ment. Decisions as to who will be partners are not within the protection of
Title VII.""
IV. LAWFUL OR UNLAWFUL TERMINATION
As her third theory for basing a claim, Ms. Hishon attempted to show
that because she was asked to leave the firm, she was denied the employment
opportunity of being promoted to partnership status.7 6 Even though this argu-
"Id. at 266 n.158.
"1678 F.2d at 1029.
6"425 F. Supp. at 123.
"Id.
'FED. R. Civ. P. 12.
72425 F. Supp. at 125.
"Id. at 127.
1"678 F.2d at 1029.
"Id.
76Id.
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ment has merit based on the rationale of Lucido, it was obvious that the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals would in no way allow Title VII to encroach upon
"individuals' decisions to voluntarily associate in a business partnership.""
Although it recognized that a cause of action could exist for an unlawful ter-
mination based on sexual discrimination, the Eleventh Circuit again refused
to extend that concept to include the lost employment opportunity to become
a partner.7 In attempting to rationalize its decision, the court added that Ms.
Hishon had knowledge at the time she accepted her position as an associate
with the firm of not only the potential for partnership, but also the consequences
of termination if a partnership invitation was not extended. 79 The court further
suggested that in lieu of pursuing this action under a Title VII discrimination
suit, she should consider an action based on breach of contract or fraud."
0
Hishon, however, had already agreed to limit her appeal only to the partner-
ship issue and had withdrawn the second and third counts of the complaint,
which included a breach of contract claim.8"
In addition to the concept of voluntary association among partners, the
court's reluctance to extend the scope of Title VII to include the partnership
decision can be explained by the lack of objective qualifications by which to
judge the potential partner.82 In essence, the court would be second-guessing
the discretionary judgments of the partners.8 3 Subjective factors such as sincerity,
appearance, poise, and the ability to understand and articulate conceptual
matters" are taken into account in the evaluation process. These factors depend
on the "chemistry" between the partners and associates,"5 The district court
in Hishon stated the same proposition in a different manner: "[I1n a very real
sense a professional partnership is like a marriage .... To use or apply Title
VII to coerce a mismatched or unwanted relationship too closely resembles a
statute for the enforcement of shotgun weddings."8 6 In addition to the above
reasons why Title VII should be inapplicable to a partnership decision, many
courts have come to realize that there are only a very limited number of posi-
tions open at the top level of many professional fields.87 As the court in Faro
v. New York University articulated, "[ojf a hypothetically twenty equally
"Id. at 1028.
"Id. at 1029.
791d.
"Id. The court expressed it's cognizance of how much significance is given to a partnership potential when
a prospective associate is considering accepting a position at a given firm.
'Id. at 1025 n.5.
"Faro v. New York University, 502 F.2d 1229 (2d Cir. 1974); Accord, Olmstead, Law as a Business: The
Impact of Title VII on the Legal "Industry", 10 VAL. U.L. REV. 479 (1976).
83Id.
'Accord, Bartholet, Jobs in High Places, 95 HARV. L. REV. 945, 996 (1982).
851d.
8624 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1303, 1305 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
87502 F.2d 1229 (2d Cir. 1974).
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brilliant law school graduates in a law office, one is selected to become a
partner.""
The difficulty in ascertaining whether or not discrimination ever existed,
the potential for a tremendous number of frivolous lawsuits and the concept
of voluntary association are certainly considerations which the court must take
into account when attempting to decide whether to extend the protective
language of Title VII to include partnership decisions.
V. CONCLUSION
In the last year, among the nation's 151 largest law firms, the percentage
of women lawyers increased from approximately fifteen to seventeen percent,
while the percentage of women partners increased from approximately seven
to eight percent. 9 Ms. Hishon has creatively been able to convince the United
States Supreme Court to listen to her arguments. 90 There are conflicting opinions
between the circuits and the stage is set for the Supreme Court to render a
decision which could have an enormous effect upon the legal, engineering and
accounting professions across the nation. If the Supreme Court chooses to
interpret the statute in a narrow and restrictive manner as did the lower courts
in Hishon, then this is certain to have an impact on the rapidly increasing number
of women both contemplating a legal career and those already practicing. The
result may very well be a change in the tide and a corresponding decrease in
the number of very capable women entering the legal profession. On the other
hand, if this Court of last resort chooses a broad and liberal interpretation
of Title VII as did the Lucido court, then there is certain to be a tremendous
impact on many law firms' policies of promotion and possibly even hiring.
Partners may be hesitant to hire an attorney as an associate if the likely poten-
tial exists that a Title VII action may be brought against them in the future
by an eager and aspiring young attorney striving to achieve one of the few posi-
tions at the top of the ladder. Partners and associates of firms throughout the
country will certainly be anxiously awaiting the outcome of this issue.
Gus YOGMOUR, JR.
"Id. at 1232.
"Wall Street Jouronal, Jan. 25, 1983, at 4, col. 2. See also Fossum, Women In The Legal Profession:
A Progress Report, 67-4 WOMEN LAW. J. 1 (1981).
"678 F.2d 1022 (1lth Cir. 1982) cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 813 (1983).
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